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Abstract. Enabling trust on the Semantic Web to ensure more efﬁcient agent inter-
action is an important research topic. Current research on trust seems to focus on de-
veloping computational models, semantic representations, inference techniques, etc.
However, little attention has been given to the plausible trust strategies or tactics that
an agent can follow when interacting with other agents on the Semantic Web. In this
paper we identify ﬁve most common strategies of trust and discuss their envisaged
costs and beneﬁts. The aim is to provide some guidelines to help system developers
appreciate the risks and gains involved with each trust strategy.
1 Introduction
Trust is at the heart of the Semantic Web (SW) vision. Trust is a method of dealing with
uncertainty; when dealing with independent agents, institutions or providers of resources
(including knowledge), one trusts them if one accepts their characterisation of what they
will do. Trust can be a moral notion (X trusts Y to act in X’s interests), or not (X trusts Y
to perform some task T). Adopting the attitude of trust towards others means that one can
plan and cooperate more efﬁciently, at the cost of greater risk of wasting resources when
trust is misplaced.
The SW, conceived as a collection of agents, will therefore function more effectively
when trust is licensed. As pointed out in [2], trust is essential for agents collaboration;each
agent will have to make subjective trust judgements about other agents with respect to the
services they claim to be able to supply.
There has been a good deal of research in this ﬁeld [19]. But from the SW point of
view, there are some interesting higher-level problems still to be addressed [26]. In the ﬁrst
place, many of the approaches are ﬁrmly in the ﬁeld of multi-agent systems, where trust
is also clearly a deep issue. However this has meant that some of the important problems
speciﬁc to the SW are inevitably glossed over. Furthermore, many approaches have been
technical ’ﬁxes’ which make a good deal of sense in circumscribed, speciﬁc contexts, such
as commercial negotiations exploiting some relatively rigidly deﬁned notion of ‘agent’.
Secondly,because of the technical nature of many solutions, there are few signs of con-
sensus emerging in the ﬁeld. In itself, this is not a serious problem - the more solutions,
evenpartialones,thebetter,forheterogeneousanddistributedsystems.But we argueinthis
paper that some higher-level patterns are emerging, and outlines of general approaches be-
comingvisible,whichmaybeofhelpinunderstandingandcomparingcurrentresearch,and
planning future developments. These higher-level patterns can be understood as strategies
for placing trust. Or, in other words, general attitudes towards other agents in conditions
of uncertainty. The best strategy will vary based on many variables, such as context, risk,
cost, task undertaken, etc.2 Situating Trust for the Semantic Web
There are a number of challenges to set an infrastructure that could promote trust, not least
the lack of consensus in the ﬁeld as to the best way of doing it [26]. How should trust
be modelled? What information is relevant? What features should online trust have? Is it
analogous to ofﬂine trust? How do we preserve the link between trust of other agents, and
the incentives for those agents to be trustworthy?
Let us brieﬂy set out some of the more pertinent challenges.To beginwith, the SW, as a
collection of agents, will be highly distributed. In such a structure, the idea of a centralised
authority is hard to sustain, though such authorities are useful for fostering trust. More
plausible is the idea of various competing authorities in restricted domains. Against that is
the idea of an agent being responsible for gathering enough information for its own trust
judgements; this would be ideal in a large distributed system, but may be prone to error,
dependingon how many information sources there were and how reliable they were [6][4].
Second, assuming that trust on the SW is not totally centralised, an agent will have
to be able to discover relevant information from a variety of heterogeneous sources. [11]
suggests that an agent must combine informationfrom various sources effectively (eg from
its own experienceand that of other agents, agents certiﬁcates, and agents’s roles), estimate
the trustworthiness of those sources, and manage to cope with strategies of lying agents.
Third, agents must be able to exchange information effectively [14]. In particular, it
must be possible to bootstrap trust in a context before there have been enough transactions
between the protagonists to make ﬁrm judgements.
Fourth, how can we model trust without undermining incentives for trustworthiness (if
an agent knows what signals I look for when judging trust, that agent now only has an in-
centive to give out those signals, not to behave in a trustworthy manner)? What knowledge
should agents try to gather? And what properties of trust need be taken into account?
Fifth, as we have conceived the SW, trust is subjective and dependent on context [4];
an agent may be trusted to do one task with one set of resources, yet not trusted to do a
different task with different resources. Will it be possible to produce models of trust that
respect this context-sensitivity without increasing computational overheads too greatly?
In the next two sections, we will look at the costs and beneﬁts of certain strategies
of placing trust, and consider which are well-placed to address the challenges we have
outlined in this section.
3 Trust strategies for the Semantic Web
A strategy for trust is an attitude towards the relative costs and beneﬁts of secured interac-
tion,unsecuredinteractionor nointeractionat all. For instance,a safetycritical system may
regard avoiding catastrophic failure as an important part of its function, even if the risk is
very low. Hence it will be prepared to accept high costs for refusing cooperationwith other
agents where failure could lead to a catastrophe. On the other hand, an agent might accept
a broker’s suggestion of an unreliable SW service if the cost of failure was low.
There are manystrategies possible for dealing with trust on the SW. Examinationof the
SW and related ﬁelds leads us to sketch ﬁve potential strategies, based on a rough division
of approaches. We identify ﬁve basic strategies (ﬁg. 1).Fig.1. Five basic strategies from placing trust.
Much variation is possible within these strategies, and we do not claim that these are
the only strategies available, or appropriate for the SW. Furthermore,it is possible to imag-
ine systems that adopt a mixture of these strategies opportunistically, depending on what
information is available to them at any moment, what risk they are prepared to bear, and
what resources they have available to them. In other words, a system might change be-
tween strategies dynamically as circumstances (costs, risks, or the environment, for exam-
ple) change. As an example, see [5], which switches between the ﬁrst two of the strategies
weoutline,dependingonits previoussuccessesandfailureswithstrangers.Differentstrate-
gies get used as the system’s understanding of the environment alters.
Note also that our discussion ignores the question of who takes the actual trust deci-
sions. It is neutral on the question of how the preferences of people or policies of corpo-
rations interact with the agents’ trust strategies. Clearly it is unlikely that software agents
would get complete autonomy in important transactions.
3.1 Optimistic Systems:
Optimistic systems accept others unless there is reason not to trust. If the beneﬁts of coop-
eration are relatively large or the costs of betrayal are relatively small, risk is low, and the
gains from trust massively outweigh the gains from distrust. Such systems are also likely to
beneﬁt from decentralisation; self-policing ensures the shared ethics of the user population
determine the policies of trust management [13].
Other systems exploit optimism for the purposes of a bootstrapping process. For ex-
ample, in referral systems [27], each user has a personal agent which stores a user model.
A user sends a query to his agent, which then suggests potential contacts to whom to send
the query (which is an iterative process). In such a system users can form models of others
on the basis of the replies they give. However, they need replies - and they need to act on
them - if they are to gain any information that will enable them to adjust their acquaintance
models. The system will bootstrap more quickly with an optimistic strategy.
Optimism Optimism is a very simple strategy. Basically it is the idea that an agent will
trust anotheragent even if its performanceis uncertain,unless there are positive reasons for
not trusting it. The basic idea is that trust is the default attitude. Hence an agent will accept
the bona ﬁdes of other agents offering services unless they fail one or more tests.
3.2 Pessimistic Systems:
CS AKTive Space (CAS) [23] is a SW application, which provides browsable representa-
tions of the discipline of Computer Science in the UK. The information is harvested off theWeb and stored by various techniques to acquire knowledge. The approach chosen by [23]
is to rely on sites whose brands are trusted, for example the Web sites of computer science
departments in the UK, thus increasing the change to getting sound data. [6] attempts to
understandthe SW as an ecologyof agents, rather than a big database, and suggests the use
of authoriseddelegations,that is the grantingof a right to one agent by another,which must
meet variousconstraints beforetheycan be acceptedby other agents.It is claimed that such
systems, which take a generally pessimistic view of other agents and knowledge sources,
have clear advantages in the distribution of trusting decisions ([12], [4], and section 3.3 be-
low). [18]describe a pessimistic approach,thoughintriguinglyhybrid.Theysuggest taking
in information from past interactions about both the conﬁdence of an agent in other agents,
as well as their conﬁdence in this agent. Given a quantity of such information, agents can
be ranked in terms of their reliability. Such systems in effect take a high rank as evidence
of reason for trust; hence in such a system many trustworthy agents may fail to be trusted.
Pessimism Pessimistic strategies restrict interactions with agents unless there is a reason
to trust them. Note that the pessimism correspondsto trust via personal acquaintance in the
ofﬂine world, which is the basic model of trust (local trust, [17]). Such a model of trust is
not often capable of supporting and underlying very complex societies [7].
3.3 Centralised Trust Systems:
A system which helps users annotate information sources is described in [8]. It provides
themwithaformalismforexpressingagreement/disagreement,andtheargumentativestance
of the source.This is then used to measurea context-sensitiveevaluationof the source. [15]
proposes a centralised agent to measure the reputation of Web services by monitoring and
collecting client feedback, and making this information available to other agents.
Relying on centralised institutions to measure trust takes the burden off the interactive
agents when deciding which agents to trust. However, such systems raise the question of
how trustworthy are the sources of their trust information in the ﬁrst place, and why such
trust warehouses should be trusted at all [4]. One observation made in [20] with respect to
eBay is that users feedback is almost always positive. The authors note that most people do
not like giving negative feedback, unless revenge is a motivation. Clearly the centralised
trust system, be it eBay or otherwise, is only as good as the information it is receiving and
brokering; if, as with eBay, there is a bias in the information coming into the system and
being displayed, then the strategy of other agents of shifting trust to the centralised system
may well be non-optimal. Similarly, [6] argue against centralised units for measuring trust
because of their scalability limitations and the implicit trust measurementmechanismsthey
adopt.
CentralisationCentralisingtrust involveslayingoffthe costs ofinteractingwith andinves-
tigating agents to a central institution or authority. The institution may certify a particular
agent as willing and able to act in some speciﬁed way. If the agent bears a certiﬁcate, then it
couldbetrusted.However,thisdoesnotobviatetheneedfortrust,butthetrustrequirements
are reduced. The agent now only needs to trust the institution - can it investigate potential
agents thoroughly, and does it have the powers to sanction betrayals effectively? Some in-
stitution, like [8]’s TRELLIS system, merely holds the relevant collected information for
users to process themselves.3.4 Trust Investigation Systems:
In [24],a Bayesian system is describewhichmodels trust in a P2P ﬁle distributionnetwork.
On such a network, peers make recommendations to each other about where suitable ﬁles
might be found. The agents ‘gossip’ with each other, by exchanging and comparing their
Bayesian networks. After this comparison, the agents update their trust ratings of each
other,dependingonwhethertheyshare similarpreferences,ontheassumptionthatanagent
with similar preferences is more likely to give suitable recommendations than others.
In other words, the agents perform an investigation of the others in order to deter-
mine how likely it is that their recommendations will be useful. The agents do not simply
receive the recommendations passively; they compare Bayesian networks, and undertake
extra computational tasks, in order to determine their suitability.
Another example of this sort of approach is provided by systems that negotiate au-
tomatically to extract trust credentials from other parties. For example, the TrustBuilder
system [25] works by iterative disclosure of credentials by the negotiating parties, in re-
sponse to a series of requests for credentials, until either the set of credentials is exhausted,
and the negotiation concludes unsuccessfully, or until sufﬁcient trust between the parties
has been established. The credentials are usually supplied by centralised authorities, and so
this version of investigation has strong links with the previous strategy. But the point of a
negotiation is that the agents themselves do (potentially a lot of) computation on the cre-
dentials, the context and the current state of negotiation to work out (a) which credentials
to ask for, (b) how to evaluate responses, and (c) how much information to release at each
stage in the negotiation.
Investigation This suggests a fourth strategy. Trust is a response to uncertainty. But trust
imposes risks. Hence, to avoid some risk, one strategy is to reduce uncertainty by inves-
tigating or evaluating other agents to determine some salient details of operation. It is not
passive; it actively tries to discover aspects of the environment that are relevant to reduce
uncertainty.
3.5 Transitive Trust Systems:
In [10], authors argue that a likely future scenario will be a networked infrastructure of
entities, linkedbyvariousad hocnetworkingtechnologies.Theyuse the small worldtheory
[16], which hypothesises that any pair of objects in a random network will be connectedby
a relatively short chain of random acquaintances. This entails that if such mutual chains of
acquaintances are used to determine initial trust between a pair of entities, then the method
will scale up well because these chains are likely to be small.
Social network analysis techniques are used in [9] to measure trust over a Friend of a
Friend (FOAF)1 network, extended with trust relations. A similar approach of exploring
webs of trust is described in [21], where users provide trust values for a number of other
users, which are used to measure trust. These algorithms, as in [8], rely on manually-set
trust opinions, which once more shifts the problem of trust to the source of the opinions.
As [3] are correct to argue, trust is not strictly transitive. If A trusts B, and B trusts
(and maybe recommends)C, nothing follows about whether A trusts C. However,there are
some circumstances where transitivity happens, at least locally. Similarly, transitive effects
can be seen where trust is given a recursive deﬁnition [4].
1 http://www.foaf-project.org/One weakness of much of the work above is the lack of sensitivity to context. Context
is a basic feature of trust [4] and must therefore be considered when dealing with it. For
example you may trust a colleague to write a good project proposal,but you might not trust
him to ﬁx your car. Associating trust measurement with a speciﬁc context will inevitably
increase complexity, but nevertheless is crucial for deriving meaningful trust values. Some
notion of context could be obtained from the type of relations between networked agents,
which plays a crucial role when measuring agent’s reputation [22].
Exploring Transitivity These systems can be described as using the strategy of exploiting
transitivity. The idea of this strategy is that an agent sends a message out about whether a
potential agent is trustworthy. The network of acquaintances of that agent will then either
send back an opinion based on experience, or pass the message onto its acquaintances,
many of which will be unknown to the ﬁrst agent. The aim is to increase the scope of
an agent’s knowledge by exploring the network feature of agents communities to bring in
information from other, unknown, agents.
As noted above, the issue of context is important, and the trade-off between investi-
gating context and relying on others’ reports and recommendations shows the close rela-
tionship between the strategies of Investigation and Exploring Transitivity. In many actual
systems and situations, there is likely to be a tight coupling between the two strategies, as
investigation ameliorates some of the difﬁculties of exploiting transitivity.
4 Costs and Beneﬁts
The main point of a trust strategy is to provide a way to operate under uncertainty, not
taking too many risks, not missing too many opportunities,not deliberating too long before
makingcommitments.Therefore,beforesettingupaplanofinteractionbetweenSW agents
itis necessarytounderstandtherisks andbeneﬁtsassociatedwiththeselectedtruststrategy.
There are many different kinds of costs and beneﬁts an agent might incur when com-
municating or dealing with other agents and services. Here we discuss four types of costs;
operational, opportunity, deﬁciency, and service charges. We describe our estimations for
each of these costs with respect to each of the ﬁve trust strategies discussed earlier, and
summarise them in ﬁgure 2.
4.1 Operational cost
Operational costs are the expenses of operating a trust strategy. In other words, this is the
cost of setting up and operating the whole trust plan. Therefore, the more complex the
strategy is the higher the cost is expected to be.
Thecost ofoperatinganoptimisticstrategyis relativelysmall. Obviouslyit gets smaller
the more optimistic the agent becomes, with a limiting case of zero when the agent takes
all agents’ bona ﬁdes as genuine. Pessimistic agents tend to run a set of tests to limit the
number of agents they interact with. However, this does not necessarily lead to high op-
erational costs. The one property that pessimism shares with optimism is that the strategy
can be based on a very small and non-complex set of tests, which may involve merely the
checking of identities. As the judgments about cooperation become more ﬁne-grained, as
for example with the investigation strategy, then operational costs will increase accord-
ingly. One effect of trust is to cut out transaction costs, and naturally the effect of deciding
to investigate rather than to trust is to reinstate them.Agents in a centralised systems can look forward to very low operational costs because
thecomplexpartsofthestrategy(e.g.investigations)will behandledbytheinstitutionitself
(which can garner economies of scale). If the agent is part of a network where transitivity
is adopted as a trust strategy, then it will incur some operational costs to implement and
tune the techniques required to perform the network analysis. It may also incur costs as a
by-product of being in a network, by having to pass on its experiences to other agents.
4.2 Opportunity cost
This is the cost of missing some possibility of generating beneﬁt via interaction. The opti-
mistic approachminimises opportunitycosts. The more optimistic the agent, the less likely
it is to miss some opportunityfor interaction. On the other hand, there is the potential for a
large opportunity cost with pessimistic agents by missing out on the potential to add value
because of a reluctance to trust agents to perform necessary subtasks.
Opportunitycosts may be higher with the centralised strategy than under the optimistic
strategy as the agents’ interaction will be limited to those certiﬁed by the institution. How-
ever, the cost should still be fairly low if many agents are certiﬁed. Opportunity costs are
also likely to be high with the investigation strategy, unless the agent has the capacity and
resources to investigate enough potential agents to keep opportunity costs down. With the
transitivity strategy,the largerthe networkrelativeto the space of possible interactions,and
the better its advice, the lower the opportunity costs.
4.3 Deﬁciency cost
Defecting agents fail to act as they claimed. The deﬁciency cost is the cost of betrayal by
an agent. This cost is strongly associated with the amount of risk undertaken by an agent.
The risk of betrayal is high with optimistic agents, and so, the agent should plan for
likely cost of an agent defecting. Equally for pessimistic agents the deﬁciency cost should
be low. The main advantage of investigation is the lowering of risk by the simple expedi-
ent of lowering uncertainty. By performing an investigation or evaluation, the agent gains
knowledge about whether and how the other agent is going to work.
The big advantage of a centralised system is that a small outlay of trust on the part of
the agent still allows interaction with a large number of agents. However, this increases
systemic risk. In a distributed system, a betrayal of trust will typically cause the agent to
withdraw trust from the offendingagent. But if an agent comes to another with a certiﬁcate
issued by an institution, and then betrays that agent, the betrayed agent may well withdraw
trust from that institution’s procedures, and therefore refuse to cooperate with any of the
institution’s clientbase. Thescalability problemofcentralisedsystems adds to thesystemic
risk [4]. As the number of certiﬁed agents increases, then the degree of trust in the central
authority may well begin to fall. Hence [4] recommend a strategy of pessimism, combined
with a distributed system of trust management.
As for the transitivity strategy, if the network is large, then deﬁciency risk may also
be large. But, unlike with an institution, it may be possible to weed out the source of bad
advice from a network, and the network may be able to reconﬁgure itself and recover.
Hence the advantage of exploring transitivity is that its costs may undercut those of the
other strategies, and will also be spread, thereby hedging the risk.4.4 Service charges
Agents may have to pay for purchasing services from other agents. Even on the most un-
commercial views of the SW, there is little dispute that there will be a major effort required
to populate it. Many people will of course be more than willing to post information on
the SW, but the effort required to populate the space with enough RDF, and to ensure that
the information posted will be that required or desired by other users will be non-trivial.
Incentives of some kind will be required if the SW is to spread out of the academic ghetto.
Incentives and other charges may be high with the optimistic strategy for two reasons.
First,theoptimisticagentmaywellpurchasemoreservicesfromagentsthanthosepursuing
other strategies. Second, in the absence of strict monitoring of agent performance, higher
payments may be required to ensure the alignment of interests.
Payment for services by pessimistic agents may be lower, as in some circumstances
the agent can act on the understanding that its interests are aligned with those of the other
agent. An additional advantage is that the smaller number of agents with whom the main
agent interacts will reduce the complexity of any decision-making.
Adopting the investigation strategy may result in high operation costs, as its investi-
gations themselves may well require consultation with many services. Similarly with the
transitivity strategy - exploring the network may involve accessing fee-based services.
Operation costs of agents who rely on centralised units for handling trust is low. How-
ever, there might be a charge to be paid for this service. But because such institutions will
probably serve many agents, they will beneﬁt from economies of scale, and their charges
shouldbe muchless thanthe accumulatedcosts of dealingwith severaldistributedservices.
Fig. 2. Costs estimates for ﬁve trust strategies.
5 Meeting the Challenges of the SW
How do these strategies address the challenges for the SW set out in section 2? The cheap
and simple strategies strategies; optimism and pessimism, meet most of the challenges half
way, by avoiding most of the complexities of the situation (eg. binary modelling of trust
makes its computation much simpler). Bootstrapping is trivial with optimism, but very
challenging with pessimism. Both approaches however, fail to take account of the context
sensitivity of trust judgements.Investigation as a strategy can be very useful for bootstrapping trust, as some relevant
properties of an agent may be known before it has actually begun to operate in a domain.
Furthermore, investigation could meet the context challenge, assuming the methods of in-
vestigation were sensitive to the changes in context. However, the distributivity of the SW
will make thorough investigation increasingly costly.
Centralisation is similar in some respects to investigation. If centralised authorities dis-
tribute certiﬁcates of trustworthiness in some domains that increase in complexity, it may
be hard for such authorities to scale up. That does not mean that this strategy should not be
used; only that such systems can only expect to ﬂourish with a certain amount of ﬂexibil-
ity. Users of competing authorities will need to decide between them, which may impose
transaction costs.
The most interesting systems are those that exploit transitivity, in that they allow rela-
tively ﬂexible responses. For instance, a system using the transitivity strategy could cope
with the problems of scale caused by increasing distributivity by pruning its searches; as
trust is affected by the length of a chain of recommendations, falling as the chain gets
longer, this pruning is unlikely to result in the loss of too much investigation. In this way,
the analysis of a social network is analogous to the discovery of communities of practice
[1], where shorter paths indicate stronger links.
Where most transitivity systems break down most seriously is on context dependence.
Systems such as those of [9][21] tend to rely on ﬁxed trust values explicitly given by users
for others to use. This is of course valuable information, but rather than respecting the
subjectivity of trust, it creates an objective sum of others’ subjective valuations - not the
same thing. One could imagine network analysis techniques, on the lines of [1], being ex-
ploited here. If the agent could specify which relationships in a representationof a network
are the most important for it, in its speciﬁc context, then trust values could be determined
dynamically depending on that speciﬁcation.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
The SW, will be large, heterogeneous, dynamic and uncertain. Trust will inevitably be an
issue. But for trust to ﬂourish in such an environment,agents must be ﬂexible, and adaptive
to new contexts. To do this, it is important to reason at a strategic level, to think in terms of
classes of acceptable outcomes.To this end, an understandingof how the costs and beneﬁts
of various strategies vary across contexts is essential. As we have seen, different strategies
can be advantageous in different circumstances. In general, given the SW challenges, the
strategy of exploring transitivity by trying to create chains of trusting judgements, seems
quite promising,thoughin certain circumstancesother strategies will reveal their strengths.
This paper has produced a preliminary classiﬁcation of strategies based on an a brief
survey of approaches. This classiﬁcation certainly is not the ﬁnal word. But when a ro-
bust classiﬁcation is available, it will remain to produce quantitative evidence about which
strategies are valuable where - and when this evidence is available, it might be possible for
actual trust mechanisms to be provided by SW service brokers. Such evidence might well
be produced on experimental testbeds such as that described in [11].
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